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If you spend any time around defense tech, you’ll hear from someone that their startup is going to reindustrialize America. It comes up in pitch decks, conferences, and in company manifestos.

You know who you are 🫡 | Dan Magy 🏴‍☠️ | 17 comments

I am sure most of these founders mean it. Their patriotism is real, and many of them are building things that should be built. But getting to reindustrialization for the defense industrial base is much harder than standing up a megafactory and churning out a lot of cheap drones. This is because fulfilling promises to reindustrialize America (both for the general good and for investors) requires a national political commitment that no single company can make on behalf of the country.

This political commitment to defense reindustrialization involves two choices. The United States must decide what kinds of wars it is preparing for and understand public support for those wars. It also must decide whether to intervene in the economy to sustain defense capacity at levels that the peacetime market will not support. A startup can contribute to shaping these choices, but at the end of the day these choices are not up to a startup to make. In this way, “reindustrialize” startups are downstream of politics.

I have been thinking about these political questions after reading Tyler Hacker’s excellent CSBA monograph, The Arsenal of Democracy: Myth or Model? (while seeing reindustrialization commentary on LinkedIn at the same time). Hacker reconstructs American industrial mobilization from the interwar planning period to the peak of World War II production and beyond, and he describes which parts of that experience offer a useful model today.

He also dispels some myths. The familiar story presented by startups aspiring to reindustrialize America is that American industry was a vast reserve of productive strength waiting to be activated. Hacker shows the incompleteness of this narrative. Turning American industrial strength into the Arsenal of Democracy required years of false starts, including contentious government policies, huge amounts of funding, and brand new institutions that did not always work. More than anything, creating the arsenal of democracy required political will.

Even President Roosevelt struggled to mobilize the requisite national political will in the run up to the United States’ entry to World War II. Before December 7th, 1941, many Americans did not want to get drawn into what was considered a European war. Mobilization of the arms industry looked like a step in that direction, making it difficult for Roosevelt to prepare the country for a conflict he believed was inevitable but was still publicly promising to avoid.

Our experience during World War II puts the limits of today’s reindustrialization pitch decks into perspective. If Roosevelt with a political trifecta had trouble mobilizing American industry in 1940, can a founder really reindustrialize America alone? This is unlikely.

Demand for defense reindustrialization is downstream of defense strategy and politics. These imperatives drive the kinds of wars the United States prepares for and thus the quantity and quality of the weapons its military needs.

World War II illustrates the point clearly. In 1943, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin had to settle whether the Western Allies would invade northern France or continue their advance through the Mediterranean. These strategic and political choices of enormous consequence shaped what the United States needed to produce. A cross-Channel invasion or a Mediterranean campaign (to say nothing of the Pacific campaign) each required a different mix of amphibious assault ships, aircraft, bombs, and artillery.1 Industry could inform what was feasible, but could not control the demand for specific industrial goods.

Nor did choosing a strategy make industrial demand predictable. Hacker’s monograph describes how planners severely underestimated artillery-shell consumption in North Africa. In fact, even after adjusting plans upwards, the shortage was still “especially acute in the European theater in late 1944, leading to the rationing of shells and reduced firing rates.”2 In one sense, this was the opposite problem we are having today. Demand was so high that industry could not keep up, but it illustrates the same underlying difficulty that military demand is hard to predict, and today’s shortage may not be tomorrow’s.

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We see the same dynamic in the war with Iran and the operation in Venezuela, where the character of the conflicts shapes industrial demand. The Iran campaign has consumed precision-strike weapons and air- and missile-defense interceptors at concerning rates. The operation to capture Nicolás Maduro, in contrast, required mostly intelligence capabilities and special operations forces. Both required formidable military capabilities, but they created very different demands for munitions sustainment.

That distinction should matter to investors. The current munitions shortage is real and severe. In my opinion, it must be addressed. But neither my opinion nor military need by itself funds munitions. It is Congress which must use the power of the purse to fund munitions, and elected leaders must persuade the public to sustain this commitment. A founder may therefore have identified a genuine military shortfall while depending on external political considerations.

Part of the problem with the reindustrialization pitch comes from the heroic way startups perceive themselves. In the Silicon Valley conception of things, the founder identifies a failure, builds something better, and changes the world through technology. That model might work in commercial markets, and defense startups can often build better products than the government or traditional defense contractors. But reindustrialization is not simply a product that a company can create through good execution. It requires government intervention — it’s a symbiotic relationship.

The economics of defense production make that intervention unavoidable. A private company has little reason to maintain idle factories and redundant suppliers because it will lose money. Yet those are precisely the capabilities the government needs if it wants production to surge immediately at the start of a crisis. During World War II, we did not simply place orders and wait for private industry to respond. We financed industrial excess capacity beforehand and absorbed risks that firms would not bear.3

A modern reindustrialization effort would require its own version of this, including multiyear contracts, stockpiling, subsidies for excess capacity, and perhaps controversially, government stakes in critical defense industries. Without such measures, market discipline will push companies to eliminate the slack that mobilization requires. Therefore, to reindustrialize the defense industrial base, a company needs not only good technology and execution, but also sustained government intervention in the economy and a good government relations team.

The government takes a risk here as well. It might spend billions on capacity that goes unused while private companies and their investors still earn returns.

Hacker puts this spending into perspective: